



RELEASE IN FULL

Thomas E. Donilon
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington DC

December 19, 2011

Dear Mr. Donilon

We have been working together for the past decade to support direct United States and Iran official relations to end their potential proliferation and improve relations over Iraq and Afghanistan. Our objective has been to help each side agree to work toward a new relationship, including more transparency of and clearer limits on Iran's nuclear program. From our ongoing contacts with current and former Iranian officials we now believe there is an opening for the US and the P5+1 to achieve an important breakthrough in our long frustrating efforts with the Iranians about their nuclear program.

We see this as an opportunity to end Iran's enrichment at the 20% level, reduce or eliminate its stockpile of 20% material to zero, and impose a cap that would limit enrichment to 5%. Such an agreement would establish principles that would constrain Iranian behavior while strengthening America's international position should Iran seek to transgress those lines in the future.

The moment to accomplish this goal has developed quite recently because sanctions have weakened Iran's position and the Tehran Research Reactor will soon run out of fuel. Iranian officials seem to lack confidence that their 20% enriched uranium will be of sufficiently high quality or that the fuel rods they build will be technically adequate to operate the reactor. These and other factors may have motivated President Ahmadinejad to propose publicly last September that Iran would cease production of 20% enriched uranium, if it could buy the fuel rods on the international market.


We have been told by people we consider reliable that the Supreme National Security Council has formally approved the offer to cap the enrichment. Despite past disputes over the TRR and the US, this proposal stands in place and has not become the subject of public controversy in Iran which we take as another sign of official approval at the top.

The US objective is to get Iran's agreement to end its accumulation of an even larger stock of 20% enriched uranium that could later be further enriched to bomb-grade material. The US would still be left with at least two valid concerns: (1) the suspicion that Iran could renew clandestinely 20% enrichment, and (2) the concern that the Iranians would be left with a large reserve of 20% enriched uranium that could be further enriched to weapons grade should they decline to go along with efforts to transfer it for use in the program to provide fuel rods. We believe that the advantage of getting a cap on Iran's enrichment program would be so significant that the USG should agree to discuss how this cap would be implemented as the basic proposition. The US and its partners could also try to negotiate safeguards and the 20% stockpile issue, but since the Iranians are offering this deal, it is clearly in the US advantage to accept the cap.


We recommend that the P5+1 accept the Iranian proposal in principle and subject to negotiated understandings. This approach would enable the Iranians to claim a diplomatic victory for their proposal in their own constituencies, while the US defines the most important aspects of the content of the agreement and achieves an important objective

We hope this will be helpful. We would be pleased to provide you a more detailed analysis of the advantages and how to overcome the disadvantages based on our thinking on this important matter.

Sincerely,




Stephen B. Heintz




William H. Luers




William G. Miller



Thomas R. Pickering



James Walsh



Frank G. Wisner