

RELEASE IN PART B6

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, June 8, 2012 7:43 AM
To: H
Cc: Hanley, Monica R
Subject: Fw: SER/Annan bilat and P5 dinner (SBU)

See readout below.

----- Original Message -----

From: Ahmed, Salman (USUN)
Sent: Thursday, June 07, 2012 11:47 PM
To: Ryu, Rexon Y
Cc: Rice, Susan E (USUN); Sullivan, Jacob J; Ford, Robert S; Brimmer, Esther D; 'Stephen E Pomper' <>>; 'Adam_M_Smith' <>>; Lasensky, Scott B; DiCarlo, Rosemary A (USUN)
Subject: SER/Annan bilat and P5 dinner (SBU)

Close-hold

Rexon,

This is quick readout on berry, so you have it before S meeting with Annan at 0945. But, SER may amend/supplement in morning. So, pls restrict distro to this group, for now.

Before dinner with P5 and Ban, SER/KA met for about 25 mins, tete-a-tete. SER's main take-aways:

- KA is in same place as we are;
- he favors pressure and thinks financial sanctions could have impact and is also attracted to an arms embargo;
- sees importance of bringing Russia along and will try to help--believes we cannot afford another veto;
- genuinely interested to hear our thoughts on political transition;
- understands Contact Group's formation alone won't move process and cannot substitute for UNSC action;
- fully gets we have difficulty with Iran's inclusion. That's why he said in media that they needed to be "part of solution" (as way to dodge question of their participation in CG);
- said he cannot undertake this role indefinitely (for which he is not being paid, incidentally) and it is taking toll on his other obligations.

On P5 dinner, nothing specific that affects bilat with Annan tomorrow. Main impressions:

- atmospherics/mood were good. It was relaxed and open conversation about pressure/unsc action, political process, and idea of Contact Group;
- participants did not have fully formed ideas on these issues and/or views diverged along lines expressed earlier in the UNSC consultations (on which full readout is being circulated separately);

B6

--no breakthroughs or agreement on anything, but there was consensus that urgent efforts were needed to avoid dangerous escalation of conflict and maintain viability of Annan mission, and that P5 should keep talking about road ahead on pressure/UNSC action and the political process.

Key points to note from Churkin's interventions (with caveat that he was speaking personally):

-- did not rule out UNSC pressure but made clear that it could not be applied exclusively on government alone and that pressures on, and obligations of opposition also needed to be addressed;

--disagreed with point stressed repeatedly by SER that government needed to diminish violence first, before opposition could be expected to reciprocate, or progress on political track could be made. He argued for parallel efforts on all fronts;

--proposed seeking clarity from parties on their views on key aspects of political process. He asked aloud whether opposition would support early parliamentary and presidential elections. But at same time, he cautioned against seeking to dictate very detailed agreement along lines of what the Arab League had tried (and failed) previously;

--Questioned why Saudi Arabia should be included in Contact Group if Iran was not included, too.

Best,
Salman