

RELEASE IN PART  
B5,B6

**From:** H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, February 8, 2010 4:07 PM  
**To:** 'slaughtera@state.gov'  
**Cc:** 'cheryl.mills [redacted] Huma Abedin  
**Subject:** Re: Notes and Thoughts for S from last week

B6

AMS---BINGO on all points. I am in FULL agreement w general points. Let's talk specifics soon, starting tomorrow.

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Slaughter, Anne-Marie <SlaughterA@state.gov>  
**To:** H  
**Cc:** Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>; Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Mon Feb 08 16:00:06 2010  
**Subject:** Notes and Thoughts for S from last week

Attached and below are notes from my conversation w/ DFID as well as a couple of other thoughts from conversations or material I read over the past week.

Thoughts and Ideas for the Week from AMS

Feb 1-5 2010

For the QDDR: As I noted earlier, I had a great meeting with Andrew Steer and Nick Dyer, director general and head of policy planning at DFID. They recounted how originally it had been necessary to declare DFID's complete independence and separation from FCO, moving DFID offices out of British embassies around the world. Today, however, Andrew said that DFID and FCO were once again co-locating, due to the cost-savings and efficiency of combining the back-office functions and the complementary skills that development experts and diplomats bring to common tasks, especially in areas like developing governance strategies. As Andrew put it, development in the 21st century is not only about "immunizing children," but rather about convincing presidents and prime ministers themselves to see childhood epidemics and maternal mortality as national crises that must be addressed. Development issues must be worked "at both ends," operationally and politically. Diplomats must convince national governments of the priority and inter-connectedness of development issues for all ministers; development experts must ensure the availability and effectiveness of actual delivery systems.

Equally interesting, individual DFID officers gain power "from being plugged into a global knowledge and access network." (I promise that I did not prompt them on this.) They argued that their field offices are "engine rooms for international dialogue," providing on the ground expertise and credibility in larger national, regional and international discussions. But the key to people listening to DFID is knowing that a DFID official has control over his or her own budget, diplomatic access back to the FCO and hence to the UN and regional organizations, access to the rest of the British government through an independent voice in Cabinet, financial international access to British representatives in the IFIs and MDBs, and access to the expertise and leverage of a global network of NGOs, foundations, corporations, international alliances such as GAVI, and other actors in the global development space. DFID's aim, in Steer's words, is to be "a networked, global organization," part of a larger global development system.

To achieve these goals, DFID and apparently the British government generally have made major changes in both management and institutional culture. Each higher official is evaluated on a points system in which points are awarded partly for how well s/he has managed his own staff, partly for how well s/he has worked across the ministry, and partly for how well s/he has worked across government. Further, if you are in-country, your evaluation depends in part on how good a report you get from the chief of mission. The point is to create a team-focused, problem-solving culture that emphasizes the value of cultivating and using connections for a common purpose.

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