

RELEASE IN PART  
B5, B6

**From:** PIR <preines [redacted]>  
**Sent:** Sunday, October 30, 2011 10:09 PM  
**To:** H; Jake Sullivan  
**Cc:** CDM; Huma Abedin  
**Subject:** Re: WaPo

Both items now fixed

-----Original Message-----

**From:** H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>  
**Date:** Sun, 30 Oct 2011 22:08:36  
**To:** 'jake.sullivan [redacted]' <jake.sullivan [redacted]>; 'preines [redacted]'  
**Cc:** 'cheryl.mills [redacted]' [redacted]; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>  
**Subject:** Re: WaPo

B6

I'm sure I spoke w HBJ just not for 90 minutes.

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Jake Sullivan [mailto:[redacted]]  
**Sent:** Sunday, October 30, 2011 09:34 PM  
**To:** preines [redacted]  
**Cc:** H; CDM <cheryl.mills [redacted]> Huma Abedin  
**Subject:** Re: WaPo

B6

It says Juppe in the piece now, so it must have been fixed.

I don't know where he got the 90-minute call with HBJ from. PIR, you might ask him.

On 10/30/11, PIR <preines [redacted]> wrote:

> Jake and I will review, and flag for Joby  
>  
>  
> -----Original Message-----  
> **From:** H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>  
> **Date:** Sun, 30 Oct 2011 21:01:35  
> **To:** 'preines [redacted]'  
> **Cc:** 'cheryl.mills [redacted]' [redacted]  
> 'jake.sullivan [redacted]' [redacted]; Huma  
> Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>  
> **Subject:** Re: WaPo

B6

> There are a few factual errors--biggest is that the 4-way call was w  
> Juppe not Sarkozy. Did I talk for 90 minutes w HBJ? Can you review for  
> other issues? [redacted]

B5

> ----- Original Message -----

> **From:** PIR [mailto:preines [redacted]]

B6

> Sent: Sunday, October 30, 2011 08:27 PM  
> To: H  
> Cc: CDM <cheryl.mills [redacted]>, Jake Sullivan  
> <jake.sullivan [redacted]>, Huma Abedin  
> Subject: WaPo

B6

> Below is the front page of tomorrow's Washington Post. [redacted]

B5

B6

> Clinton's key role in Libya conflict

> By Joby Warrick

> Washington Post

> Sunday, Oct 30, 2011

> TRIPOLI, Libya — At 5:45 p.m. on March 19, three hours before the  
> official start of the air campaign over Libya, four French Rafale jet  
> fighters streaked across the Mediterranean coastline to attack a  
> column of tanks heading toward the rebel city of Benghazi. The jets  
> quickly obliterated their targets—and in doing so nearly upended the  
> international alliance coming to Benghazi's rescue.

> France's head start on the air war infuriated Italy's prime minister,  
> who accused Paris of upstaging NATO. Silvio Berlusconi warned darkly  
> of cutting access to Italian air bases vital to the alliance's warplanes.

> "It nearly broke up the coalition," said a European diplomat who had a  
> front-row seat to the events and who spoke on the condition of  
> anonymity to discuss sensitive matters between allies. Yet, the rift  
> was quickly patched, thanks to a frenzied but largely unseen lobbying  
> effort that kept the coalition from unraveling in its opening hours.

> "That," the diplomat said, "was Hillary."

> Seven months later, with longtime American nemesis Moammar Gaddafi  
> dead and Libya's onetime rebels now in charge, the coalition air  
> campaign has emerged as a foreign policy success for the Obama  
> administration and its most famous Cabinet member, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton.

> Some Republicans derided the effort as "leading from behind" while  
> many others questioned why President Obama was entangling the nation  
> in another overseas military campaign that had little strategic  
> urgency and scant public support. But with NATO operations likely ending this week, U.S.  
> officials and key allies are offering a detailed new defense of the  
> approach and Clinton's pivotal role — both within a divided Cabinet  
> and a fragile, assembled-on-the-fly international alliance.

> What emerges from these accounts is a picture of Clinton using her  
> mixture of political pragmatism and tenacity to referee spats among  
> NATO partners, secure crucial backing from Arab countries and tutor  
> rebels on the fine points of message-management.

> Clinton, in an interview, acknowledged “periods of anguish and buyer’s  
> remorse” during the seven months of the campaign. But she said, “We  
> set into motion a policy that was on the right side of history, on the  
> right side of our values, on the right side of our strategic interests in the region.”  
>  
> From skeptic to advocate  
>  
> During the initial weeks of unrest in Libya, Clinton was among the  
> White House officials clinging to fading hopes that Gaddafi might fall  
> without any help from the West.  
>  
> From the first armed resistance on Feb. 18 until March 9, the  
> disorganized opposition movement appeared to be on a roll, taking  
> control of Libyan cities from Benghazi to Brega and Misurata on the  
> Mediterranean coast. But in a single, bloody week, Gaddafi loyalists  
> turned rebel gains into a rout, crushing resistance in towns across  
> Libya before marshaling forces for a final drive against Benghazi, the last opposition stronghold.  
>  
> With Gaddafi threatening to slaughter Benghazi’s population “like  
> rats,” the rebel leaders pleaded for Western intervention, including a  
> no-fly zone. The appeal garnered support in Europe, particularly among  
> French and British officials who began working on the text of a U.N.  
> Security Council resolution that would authorize the use of military  
> against the Libyan autocrat.  
>  
> But the idea of a no-fly zone drew skepticism from within the Obama  
> White House. Some officials, most notably then-Defense Secretary  
> Robert M. Gates, opposed military intervention. And Clinton, during  
> two trips to Europe in early March, made clear that Washington was not  
> eager to lead a politically risky military campaign against yet another Muslim country.  
>  
> She was loath to see Gaddafi trouncing aspiring democrats in his  
> country and menacing fledgling governments in neighboring Egypt and  
> Tunisia. But Clinton told aides, who later described the  
> administration’s inner workings on the condition of anonymity, that  
> the hard reality was that a no-fly zone, by itself, might make things worse.  
>  
> “We were opposed to doing something symbolic — that was the worst of  
> both worlds,” said one of the aides. “We would have crossed the  
> threshold [of intervention] without accomplishing anything.”  
>  
> Clinton had drawn up a list of conditions that included a formal  
> request by Arab states for intervention. On March 12, the 22-nation  
> Arab League did exactly that, voting to ask for U.N. approval of a  
> military no-fly zone over Libya.  
>  
> The next day, on March 13, Clinton traveled to Paris for a meeting  
> with foreign ministers from the Group of 8 countries. In the marbled  
> conference rooms of Paris’s Westin Hotel, she sat down for the first  
> time with Mahmoud Jibril, the interim leader of Libya’s fledgling  
> Transitional National Council. She also met privately with Gulf  
> diplomats to gauge Arab willingness to send warplanes to enforce a  
> possible no-fly zone. And she huddled with Russian Foreign Minister

- > Sergei Lavrov, whose country's veto potentially could block any intervention effort at the United Nations.
- >
- > "When she went to Paris, there were no instructions from the White
- > House on whether to support strong action in Libya," said a senior
- > State Department official. Yet, within three days, the official said,
- > Clinton began to see a way forward.
- >
- > "This was an opportunity for the United States to respond to an Arab
- > request for help," the official said. "It would increase U.S. standing
- > in the Arab world, and it would send an important signal for the Arab Spring movement."
- >
- > By March 15, when Clinton spoke with President Obama by phone to brief
- > him on the meetings, she had become a "strong advocate" for U.S.
- > intervention, one administration official said. The president, who had
- > been weighing arguments from a sharply divided Cabinet for several
- > days, sided with his secretary of state.
- >
- > Clinton was halfway across the Atlantic on March 17 when a resolution
- > went before the U.N. Security Council authorizing a Libyan
- > intervention with "all necessary means" — U.N. code for military
- > force. From the plane, Clinton worked the phones while the
- > administration's ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, met
- > with counterparts to line up votes and to ensure that both Russia and China would withhold their vetoes.
- >
- > The resolution passed, 10 to 0, with five countries abstaining.
- >
- > Keeping alliance together
- >
- > The French air attack that so angered the Italians two days later grew
- > from French President Nicolas Sarkozy's desire to launch an early,
- > symbolic strike before the official start of the campaign. The White
- > House did not object — Sarkozy had been a key advocate of military
- > intervention, and French leadership on Libya had boosted the president's popularity at home.
- >
- > But the other allies were wary. France had floated the idea of a
- > command structure distinct from NATO, that would include some Arabs
- > while excluding Germany and other opponents of intervention. Italy and
- > Turkey, meanwhile, insisted on NATO control and threatened to boycott any other arrangement.
- > The early French attack deepened suspicions by the two countries that
- > Sarkozy harbored "hidden agendas and different agendas," as Turkish
- > President Abdullah Gul would later say.
- >
- > With the alliance threatening to unravel, Clinton focused on damage control.
- > She spent hours on the phone and in person with Berlusconi and Italian
- > Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, who eventually played crucial roles
- > in providing air bases as staging grounds for attacks.
- >
- > The details of the military command were ultimately decided in a
- > four-way conference call between Clinton and Sarkozy, British Foreign
- > Secretary William Hague and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.
- >
- > Yet even as that conflict cooled, another one was erupting.
- >

- > Several Arab states, including Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and
- > Jordan, had agreed to supply warplanes and pilots to the coalition in
- > a symbolic show of support by Muslim countries for military action against Libya.
- >
- > But three days into the bombing campaign, the Arabs appeared to be
- > backing away, concerned by the possibility of a backlash in their own
- > countries and angered by U.S. criticism of the Saudi-led military
- > intervention in Bahrain to put down an uprising there. By March 24,
- > Qatar's four promised jets still had not yet made an appearance over
- > Libya, and the United Arab Emirates and Jordan had announced that they would provide only humanitarian assistance.
- >
- > In a bid to woo the Arabs back into the alliance, Clinton spoke for 90
- > minutes by phone with Sheik Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani, the Qatari
- > foreign minister, while also making repeated calls to the UAE's Sheikh
- > Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and to Jordan's King Abdullah II.
- >
- > "This is important to the United States, it's important to the
- > president and it's important to me, personally," Clinton told Arab
- > leaders, according to one of the State Department official.
- >
- > On March 25, Qatari-flagged Mirage 2000 jets flew their first sorties
- > over Libya, All three countries eventually would supply military
- > aircraft and experienced pilots to the Libyan campaign.
- >
- > Getting past stalemate
- >
- > The NATO-led air campaign quickly pushed Gaddafi's forces from
- > Benghazi. But by May, the alliance's planes were patrolling front lines that barely moved.
- >
- > In Washington and in Europe, the word "stalemate" began to creep into
- > opinion columns as lawmakers, skeptical of U.S. policy in Libya, began
- > threatening to block funds for military operations there. Meanwhile, a
- > cash crunch also loomed for the rebels, who were unable to sell oil
- > and were legally blocked from tapping into Gaddafi's overseas bank
- > accounts. By early July, they had run out of money for weapons, food
- > and other critical supplies.
- >
- > Clinton, ignoring the advice of the State Department's lawyers,
- > convinced Obama to grant full diplomatic recognition to the rebels, a
- > move that allowed the Libyans access to billions of dollars from
- > Gaddafi's frozen accounts. At a meeting in Istanbul on July 15, she
- > pressed 30 other Western and Arab governments to make the same declaration.
- >
- > "She brought everyone over at once," said a Western diplomat who
- > attended the Istanbul meeting.
- >
- > Tripoli fell five weeks later, after a relatively small U.S.
- > expenditure of
- > \$1 billion, and with no regular U.S. troops on the ground. In the air
- > campaign, U.S. jets flew less than a third of the missions but
- > supplied critical support in air refueling, surveillance and logistics
- > for sorties flown by more than a dozen other nations.
- >

> Still, no hero's welcome

>

> The political benefits to Clinton and Obama remain far from clear. To  
> many Libyans and others in the Muslim world, the lasting impression  
> from the campaign is that of a reluctant America, slow to intervene  
> and happy to let others take the lead. While Sarkozy and British Prime  
> Minister David Cameron were given heroes' welcomes during victory laps  
> through Libya last month, Clinton was confronted during her recent  
> Tripoli visit with questions about why the United States had not done more.

>

> "Many people feel that the United States has taken a back seat," one  
> student told her.

>

> U.S. critics of the administration's policy say the administration's  
> Libya policy, while ultimately successful, is emblematic of a slow and  
> haphazard response to the Arab Spring uprisings.

>

> "Earlier intervention might have prevented the conflict from ever  
> reaching that dangerous precipice," said Michael Singh, a former  
> senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security  
> Council under President George W. Bush. "There is a difference between  
> building an international consensus and following one."

>

> Clinton acknowledged that history's verdict on the Libyan intervention  
> was far from assured and said that NATO's formula for aiding a popular  
> uprising against a dictatorship may not be easily applied elsewhere.

>

> "We need to assess where we are, what we accomplished together, what  
> the costs were," Clinton said. Meanwhile, she said, "we do have to be  
> more agile and flexible in dealing with a lot of the challenges we  
> face, and we should be unembarrassed about that."