

RELEASE IN
PART B6

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Friday, April 8, 2011 7:56 PM
To: Oscar Flores
Subject: Fw: Libya objectives and messaging

Pls print.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Friday, April 08, 2011 07:53 PM
To: H
Subject: FW: Libya objectives and messaging

Interesting analysis, actually.

From: Tom Malinowski [mailto:]
Sent: Friday, April 08, 2011 4:01 PM
To: brhodes ; Sullivan, Jacob J; Burns, William J; ablinken ; spower ;
dshapird ; dchollet
Subject: Libya objectives and messaging

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Dear all,

You must be frustrated after days of stories about the alleged diminished focus and effectiveness of the military campaign in Libya following the transfer of authority to NATO. This narrative may not be entirely fair. But it is a problem, especially insofar as the Qaddafi regime and the Libyans being protected may misinterpret what's going on. A few thoughts on how this might be addressed:

- You have a positive story to tell about how this coalition was put together and why you did it this way – about the merits of multilateralism and burden sharing and of the United States not playing such a visibly dominant role.
- At the end of the day, however, the only thing that will matter is whether the mission in Libya succeeds. A year from now, if Benghazi and other threatened cities have been protected and Qaddafi is gone, your strategy will be deemed a success, and the “theory of the case” behind the strategy will be vindicated, with all the hopeful precedents we want to see established. But if those objectives aren't achieved, no one will give you the slightest credit for having forged an unprecedented UNSC resolution, or gotten Arab League buy in, or mobilized NATO to take on most of the burden.
- For this reason, I think you would benefit by placing less emphasis in your public messaging on the mechanics of what you're doing, and much more emphasis on the concrete objectives you are determined to achieve on the ground
- Unfortunately, the currently stated objective – civilian protection – is vague. NATO obviously can't protect all civilians in all of Libya from Qaddafi, and can't credibly enforce a demand that he cease threatening civilians everywhere at all times. In practice, the mission seems to be to create a shield around Ajdabiya and Benghazi, but you haven't said so. The coalition has not spelled out in concrete terms what actions by Qaddafi will trigger a military response, or what he must do for air strikes to

stop. There are sometimes advantages to maintaining ambiguity, but in this case it may give Qaddafi the sense that he has room to maneuver and it creates panic among the opposition leaders and civilians, who don't know where the lines are drawn.

- One solution to this problem would be to issue a clear set of war aims as we did in the roughly analogous situation in Kosovo in 1999 (analogous in the sense that military force was used to protect civilians in one part of a country, while political means were used to dislodge a dictator from the country as a whole).
- In Kosovo, NATO spent almost two weeks bombing Serbian forces without a well defined objective (apart from the broad goal of civilian protection). Then, the alliance settled on a concrete set of demands: primarily that Milosevic withdraw behind a line on the map (the border of Kosovo), which would allow Kosovar refugees to return home and peacekeepers to deploy. Until Milosevic met that demand, NATO made clear that it would strike military targets not just in Kosovo but across Serbia. President Clinton and other NATO leaders repeated that demand every day, which conveyed a sense of determination, and kept public attention focused on the mission objective, rather than the day to day muddle on the ground. No matter what question we faced, we were able to say: "We'll have better days and worse days on the battlefield, but this can only end in one way."
- An analogous approach in Libya might look something like this: NATO could issue a demand that Qaddafi (1) withdraw all his forces in the east behind a defined line on the map (far enough from Ajdabiya so that civilians can go back there and feel somewhat secure) and (2) withdraw to a perimeter outside the city of Misrata, while restoring water and electricity to its civilian population. Until Qaddafi meets these demands, NATO would continue to strike not just in the exclusion zones but at any military assets and facilities throughout the country that could be used to support operations within the exclusion zones. NATO would also make clear that it will not provide support to any rebel military operations outside the exclusion zones.
- If you all were to do this, there would be absolute clarity about the objectives of the mission. The answer to every question about day to day events or coalition dynamics could be: "What matters here is that Qaddafi must withdraw his troops from X, Y, and Z, and until he does, we are going to keep hitting him." End of story. Qaddafi would know that he can't improve his strategic position or get himself a better deal by continuing to push to see how far we'll let him go. The rebels would know what you won't do for them. Just as important, they wouldn't be as paranoid that NATO will let Qaddafi march on Benghazi again, or cut some secret deal to sell them out. This would stabilize the situation on the ground sooner, so that you can move on to achieving the ultimate political objective faster.
- I suppose one argument against drawing lines on the map is that it would suggest that Qaddafi can do what he wants on his side of the lines. But he already can, and he knows it. NATO is not going to use F-15s to protect protesters in Tripoli. If the real military objective is to protect the east and to relieve Misrata, it would be best to say so, to convey a sense of determination that the objective will be achieved, and to tell Qaddafi what price he will pay until it is. The mission would benefit from that clarity, as would your ability to address the concerns being expressed.

Best,

Tom