

RELEASE IN PART B6

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Saturday, November 26, 2011 5:59 AM
To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
Subject: Fw: H: Intel latest Egypt politics. Sid
Attachments: hrc memo intel egyptian politics 112511.docx

More...

From: sbwhoep [redacted] [mailto:sbwhoep [redacted]]
Sent: Friday, November 25, 2011 11:13 PM
To: H
Subject: H: Intel latest Egypt politics. Sid

B6

CONFIDENTIAL

November 25, 2011

For: HRC
From: Sid
Re: Egyptian politics

SOURCE: Sources with access to the highest levels of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as Western Intelligence and security services.

1. On November 24, 2011 senior officials of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), including MB Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie, received discreet notice that the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) intended to name Kamal el-Ganzouri as Prime Minister in a new, interim government of national unity. According to extremely sensitive sources with direct access to both the MB and the SCAF, the military officers made it clear to the Brothers that el-Ganzouri agreed to cooperate fully with the Army, while attempting calm the demonstrations, and establish the idea that civilian rule is returning to Egypt at a deliberate but steady pace.

2. According to these knowledgeable individuals, the SCAF officers explained that, while el-Ganzouri may succeed in reassuring the Egyptian people that the SCAF will reduce its role in the government over the next year, the Army will continue to exercise ultimate control over the country for the foreseeable future. In this regard the SCAF intends to pursue their discreet relationship with the MB, in an effort to guarantee order throughout the country. In return for this relationship, the SCAF

expects the MB to continue working to reduce the level of violence in the pro-democracy demonstrations currently underway in Cairo's Tahrir Square. For their part the SCAF officers stated in the clearest possible terms that the Army and security forces would use deadly force, if necessary, to maintain order throughout the country.

3. (Source Comment: According to a very sensitive source, Badie was not pleased with the appointment of el-Ganzouri, who served as Prime Minister from 1996-1999 under deposed President Hosni Mubarak. In the opinion of the MB leader this appointment will only serve to heighten one of the most important complaints of the people in Tahrir Square—frustration over the failure of the SCAF to purge the government of Mubarak era officials, and pursue prosecutions for government corruption and other serious crimes committed under the old regime. Badie noted that SCAF commander Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi appears to believe that el-Ganzouri's reputation as a champion of the poor will appease the demonstrators. However, this view ignores the fact that most the demonstrators were small children at the time of el-Ganzouri's first term as Prime Minister, as well as the fact that he has subsequently come under suspicion of profiting from corruption during the privatization of government owned property and resources in 1999.)

4. Badie added that he realized Tantawi preferred Mohammed el Baradei as his first choice for Prime Minister, but the long-time diplomat and current presidential candidate would not agree to the SCAF having the final say over cabinet appointments and policy decisions. Badie predicted that, despite the best efforts of the MB, the appointment of el-Ganzouri will only serve to enrage the pro-democracy demonstrators and lead to increased violence. At the same time, Badie again warned that no one should underestimate Tantawi's willingness to use deadly force to contain the demonstrations. The MB leader added that he expects the November 28 Parliamentary election to proceed as planned with the MB winning 35-40 percent of the seats. At that point the MB leaders believe they will be in a better position to deal with the SCAF in their discreet relationship.

5. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a senior member of the MB the SCAF will continue to exercise control over the political and security and situation in Egypt, even as the day-to-day functions of the government pass to elected civilians during 2012. The MB will continue to coordinate with the SCAF during this period, but over the course of the next year the leaders of the Brotherhood expect tensions to grow throughout Egyptian society. They also believe that the population will become increasingly frustrated with the military, and in reaction the SCAF can be expected to respond with force to maintain control of the security situation. This individual added that tourists and businessmen from the United States and Western Europe will need to remain alert to the possibility of spontaneous political violence, particularly as many of the new political groups view the Western governments as supporters of the Army.)