

RELEASE IN PART
B6

From: sbwhoeop [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2012 6:33 PM
To: H
Subject: H: Intel: Muslim Brotherhood on the move. Sid
Attachments: hrc memo muslim brotherhood on the move 011312.docx

B6

CONFIDENTIAL

January 14, 2012

For: HRC
From: Sid
Re: Muslim Brotherhood on the move

SOURCE: Sources with access to the highest levels of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During mid-January, 2012 Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie and his advisors, including Mohamed Mursi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), began a series of secret planning sessions aimed at developing a strategy for consolidating its success in the recently concluded three phased elections for the lower house of the new Egyptian parliament. According to individuals with access to the highest levels of the MB, Badie and the other senior members of the Brotherhood believe that once the reconciliation voting is concluded, they and their allied parties in the Democratic Alliance will control thirty eight percent of the seats in that lower house of parliament, with the al Nour party and its supporters in the Salafist Islamic Bloc holding twenty seven percent of the one hundred and fifty seats.

2. In the opinion of these individuals, despite the personal differences between Mursi and the leaders of al Nour, Badie is convinced that the MB can form an Islamic alliance which will control between sixty five and seventy percent of the seats in the lower house of the new parliament. They also believe that these voting figures will be similar after the upper house elections, which begin in late January, 2012. With this level of control the MB will be able to draft the new constitution and, if they can manipulate the Salafist and military supporters, may even be able to form an interim civilian government before the constitution is approved in May or June 2012.

3. In addition to discussions with al Nour and other, smaller Islamist parties, the MB is maintaining its sensitive, secret dialogue with the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Their challenge here is to reassure interim national leader Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and the other leaders of the SCAF that their position in Egyptian society will remain intact after the introduction of civilian, Islamist rule. According to this source, Badie was angry over press leaks of recent MB-SCAF discussions regarding guarantees against the future prosecution of SCAF officials for actions during the 2011 uprising, once they are no longer in control of the government. These leaks complicated discussions with the SCAF officers, and raised emotions among the Egyptian population, at a time when the MB is poised to gain its long sought victory, and political control of Egypt. Badie stated in private discussions that the only thing that can delay this success is a preemptive move by the military; fearing that its commanders will face the same fate as former President Hosni Mubarak.

4. (Source Comment: In the opinion of an extremely well placed individual, Badie appears to have made a degree of progress in reassuring the SCAF, but these concerns about the transition from military to civilian rule will continue to complicate matters over the coming year. According to this sensitive source, Mursi believes that the MB and, by extension, the FJP must learn to avoid provoking the military at the grassroots level, however; the party may not have enough experience in government to manage this complex process. Mursi stated in a private conversation that while many MB/FJP candidates ran for parliament as independents in 2005 and 2010 parliamentary elections, the organization as a whole still has limited political experience. In his opinion, in order to appease the SCAF, the FJP must see to it that the military retains control over its own economic and security interests. However, if, at some point in the future, the FJP considers the SCAF to be a threat to its own priorities, the party must retain the ability to activate large-scale protests using the MB's nationwide infrastructure.

5. In addition, these sensitive sources state that Mursi continues to remind Badie and the MB leadership that the SCAF is interested in separating parliament from the office of the president, because it will then be able to deal with each branch of government in a different way, while trying to manipulate the political environment. In the opinion of this individual, it is not yet known how the SCAF will approach the 2012 presidential elections, which are scheduled to take place by July 1. In this regard, the FJP continues to stress that the party will not field a presidential candidate of its own. In the opinion of this source, given the military's past successes in exploiting extreme Islamist elements in the political structure, while marginalizing the Muslim Brotherhood, the leaders of the SCAF may harbor the belief that they can control the future parliament. This individual also pointed out that the MB had received reporting that there were recent discussions between the SCAF and Salafist representatives. This individual believes that if these discussions continue, while al-Nour wins a significant portion of the seats in parliament, the SCAF will have an opportunity to weaken the FJP, if their efforts at cooperation begin to fail.

6. (Source Comment: Individuals with access to the MB leadership add that Mursi, and the political leaders of the FJP believe that when reaching a compromise with the SCAF and the Salafist parties, Badie and his senior advisors must create the impression among foreign governments and businesses that, while Egypt will be a devout Islamist state, the new Egyptian Government and the MB in particular are sophisticated enough to manage a parallel system that will allow these foreign interests to invest and participate in

the new Egypt. For his part, speaking in confidence, Mursi is not convinced that the Army and the Salafist will support this course.)